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MICKEY GOES TO FRANCE: A CASE STUDY
OF THE EURO DISNEYLAND NEGOTIATIONS
Lauren A. Newell*
In 1984, The Walt Disney Company (“Disney”) was riding the
wave of success from its newest Resort,1 Tokyo Disney Resort
(“Tokyo Disney”),2 which attracted 10 million guests3 in the first
year alone,4 and its thoughts turned to further international expan-
sion—this time, in Europe.  After careful consideration of poten-
tial locations and preliminary negotiations with two European
governments,5 Disney decided in 1984 to launch Euro Disneyland
(“Euro Disneyland” or “EDL”)6 in Marne-la-Valle´e, France.  The
realities of opening and operating EDL in France were far differ-
ent than Disney’s expectations when it began negotiations—so
much so that the Resort narrowly escaped bankruptcy.7  For an
“entertainment empire”8 like Disney, this was an unprecedented
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University, Pettit College of Law; B.A., Ge-
orgetown University, 2004; J.D., Harvard Law School 2007.
1 As used herein, “Resort” refers to a Disney resort property, consisting of (unless other-
wise indicated), Parks, hotels, all entertainment facilities, and the transportation systems that
connect them.  “Park” refers to a Disney theme park, including (unless otherwise indicated) the
park grounds, rides, and attractions, and surrounding resorts, hotels, and other Disney-affiliated
entertainment facilities.
2 Tokyo Disney was Disney’s third Park and first international venture, located in Tokyo,
Japan. See The Walt Disney Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 11–12 (Nov. 21, 2012) [herein-
after Annual Report].
3 Disney refers to Resort visitors and patrons as “guests.”  This terminology derives from
Walt Disney, who, at the opening of Disneyland Resort (“Disneyland”), established the motto
“At Disneyland, the visitors are our guests.” BILL CAPODAGLI & LYNN JACKSON, THE DISNEY
WAY: HARNESSING THE MANAGEMENT SECRETS OF DISNEY IN YOUR COMPANY 59 (1999) (in-
ternal quotation omitted).  Disneyland was Disney’s first resort property, located in Anaheim,
California. See Annual Report, supra note 2, at 9.
4 MICHAEL EISNER WITH TONY SCHWARTZ, WORK IN PROGRESS: RISKING FAILURE, SUR-
VIVING SUCCESS 263 (1998).
5 See infra text accompanying notes 19–28.
6 Euro Disneyland was Disney’s fourth Resort. See Annual Report, supra note 2, at 8–12.
On October 1, 1994, the Resort’s name was officially changed from Euro Disneyland to Disney-
land Paris. About Our Company: Our Story, DISNEYLAND PARIS, http://corporate.disneyland
paris.com/about-our-company/our-story/ (last visited July 10, 2012).  In March 2002, the Resort’s
name was officially changed again to Disneyland Resort Paris. Id.
7 See infra text accompanying note 56.
8 E.g., The Mouse Besieged, Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2004, at A36 (referring to Dis-
ney’s “fabled entertainment empire”); Jason Garcia, Disney Banking on a New Princess, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 12, 2009, at A1 (referring to “Disney’s entertainment empire”).  This is
an apt characterization, given the fact that Disney had $42.3 billion in revenue in 2012, and has
193
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failure.  This Article presents a case study of Disney’s interactions
with the French government and citizens through Euro Disneyland,
and analyzes its mistakes and attempts to rectify them in the con-
text of intercultural negotiation9 theory.  It concludes with advice
for how multinational firms like Disney should approach interna-
tional deal-making in the future to avoid repeating past mistakes.
I. FOUNDATION OF A DEAL: THE IMPORTANCE OF
CULTURE IN NEGOTIATION
Culture10 is significant in business negotiations for the simple
reason that all negotiators necessarily bring their own cultural
backgrounds to the table—cultural values influence negotiators’ in-
terests and priorities.11  Negotiation strategies that conceptually ac-
cord with a culture’s values become normative in that culture, such
that negotiators from that culture unconsciously adopt those be-
haviors.12  If viewed by members of other cultural groups as inap-
diversified business segments that include parks and resorts, media networks, consumer prod-
ucts, studio entertainment, and interactive media. See Annual Report, supra note 2, at 1–16, 28.
In addition, Disney currently owns, operates, manages, and/or licenses, directly or indirectly, six
resort properties in California, Florida, Japan, France, Hong Kong, and Hawaii, with a seventh
resort property in China currently under construction. Id. at 8–12.  Disney also operates other
resort and vacation facilities, including through a cruise line, a vacation ownership plan, and a
provider of guided vacation tour packages. Id. at 12.
9 As used in this Article, “negotiation” refers to all “back-and-forth communication de-
signed to reach an agreement when [the parties] have some interests that are shared and others
that are opposed.” ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGO-
TIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN xvii (2d ed. 1991).  This broad definition encom-
passes most interpersonal interactions.
10 As used in this Article, “culture” refers to “a set of shared and enduring meanings, values,
and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behavior.”  Guy
Olivier Faure & Gunnar Sjo¨stedt, Culture and Negotiation: An Introduction, in CULTURE AND
NEGOTIATION: THE RESOLUTION OF WATER DISPUTES 3 (Guy Olivier Faure & Jeffrey Z. Rubin,
eds., 1993) (emphasis omitted).  The “other groups” contemplated by this definition include or-
ganizations such as Disney, which have their own “organizational cultures.”  Wanis-St. John de-
fines “organizational cultures” as “‘shared mental models that the members of an organization
hold and take for granted’ and that facilitate its success.”  Anthony Wanis-St. John, Cultural
Pathways in Negotiation and Conflict Management, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
119–120 (Michael L. Moffit & Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2005), (quoting EDGAR SCHEIN, CORPO-
RATE CULTURE SURVIVAL GUIDE 20 (1st ed. 1999)).  This Article’s use of “culture” refers pri-
marily to national cultures and business cultures.
11 JEANNE M. BRETT, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO NEGOTIATE DEALS, RESOLVE
DISPUTES, AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUNDARIES 7 (2001).
12 See Catherine H. Tinsley & Madan M. Pillutla, Negotiating in the United States and Hong
Kong, 29 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 711, 713, 715 (1998).
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propriate or offensive, the culturally-shaped strategies create and
perpetuate discord in cross-cultural negotiations.13
II. THE DEAL: MICKEY GOES TO FRANCE
The original concept for Euro Disneyland was Walt Disney’s.14
He desired to pay tribute to France by building a Resort there be-
cause France’s gardens and castles had inspired his design of Dis-
neyland in Anaheim, California.15  Disney also wanted to honor his
ancestral connections to France and to celebrate the memories of
his time there as an ambulance driver during World War I.16  Dis-
ney executives first researched the idea of a European Resort in
earnest after Tokyo’s warm embrace of Tokyo Disney, and two
separate groups of executives formally pitched the concept to Dis-
ney CEO Michael Eisner and president Frank Wells in the early
1980s.17  Aware that Europeans accounted for more than two mil-
lion of the domestic Resorts’ annual visits, Eisner and Wells au-
thorized a search for the perfect European site.18  In the fall of
1984, Dick Nunis, head of Disney’s domestic Resorts, and Jim
Cora, head of construction at Tokyo Disney, presented to Eisner
and Wells the result of more than 1,200 site evaluations—the viable
options were France and Spain.19  Nunis and Cora favored Spain
for the weather, but noted the site lacked reliable phone service
and was a considerable distance from central Europe, which meant
a Spanish Resort would likely attract only summer tourists.  In con-
trast, while the agrarian French site initially seemed unimpres-
sive,20 its proximity to downtown Paris and, perhaps more
importantly, Eisner’s fond childhood memories of France made a
French Resort more favorable.21  Eisner knew that Paris com-
13 See id. at 715.
14 ANDREW LAINSBURY, ONCE UPON AN AMERICAN DREAM: THE STORY OF EURO DISNEY-




17 EISNER, supra note 4, at 262.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 264.
20 Id. at 264.
21 Id. at 265.  Eisner’s great influence over Disney during his term as its CEO makes the fact
that he favored France especially significant. See Kathryn Harris, The Loneliest Man in the
Kingdom: Forget Walt.  Michael Eisner, Disney’s Hands-on Chairman, is Shaping the Company
in His Own Image, Signing off on Everything from Scripts to Carpet Patterns.  But in Today’s
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manded steady tourism (between 12 and 16 million tourists annu-
ally in the 1980s).22  Moreover, Ile-de-France (the Paris metro area
under consideration) was zoned such that the French government,
rather than a mayoral commune, controlled it.23  Eisner also as-
sumed the French climate would not diminish the prospective Re-
sort’s success; he surmised that the French were used to bad
weather and that tourists would continue to visit France despite its
climate.24  Though Eisner was partial to France, he and Wells in-
structed Nunis and Cora to negotiate with both sides and see what
terms they would offer.
The French and Spanish governments quickly launched a bid-
ding war for Disney’s patronage.  Beyond mere bragging rights, a
Disney Resort promised the host country thousands of jobs and
billions of revenue from the projected millions of annual tourist
visits.25  Neither government wanted to lose the lucrative project,
and they both wooed Disney with financing deals, tax breaks, and
even offers of free land.26  As the Spanish minister of tourism and
transport remarked in September of 1985, “We want to obtain Dis-
neyland at any price!”27  The Disney negotiators sat back and al-
lowed the governments to raise the stakes.  Ultimately, France’s
offer proved unbeatable.  Eisner made the announcement during a
meeting with representatives of the French government in Decem-
ber 1985 that Disney would build in France.28
World of Corporate Mergers and Alliances, Can Mickey’s Competitive, Go-it-Alone Boss Keep
Winning?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at 14 (describing Eisner as Disney’s “ultimate arbiter of
taste”).
22 EISNER, supra note 4, at 265.
23 Richard F. Babcock, Mickey a la Mode, 57 PLANNING 18,19–20 (1991).  France’s 1982 dev-
olution law changed zoning, resulting in a nationwide system of municipally-controlled com-
munes.  Id. The central government’s control over the proposed Disney site decreased the
likelihood of harassment from the local municipality. See id.
24 EISNER, supra note 4, at 265.  A native of New York, a city that “barely notices” inclement
weather, Eisner attributed the climate concern to “people who’d lived in California for most of
their lives,” and did not find the objection personally “compelling.” Id.
25 See Steven Greenhouse, Playing Disney in the Parisian Fields, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1991,
at C3.  Christian Cardon, head of the French government office established to coordinate
France’s negotiations with Disney, predicted “Euro Disney is going to create at least 30,000
jobs. . . . And tourists from abroad will spend almost $1 billion a year here” (internal quotation
omitted). Id.
26 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 21.
27 Id. at 20 (internal quotation omitted).
28 Gail DeGeorge & Andres Oppenheimer, Vive Mickey!  France Snares a Disney Park,
MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 19, 1985, at 1A.
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Disney planned to open the Resort in April of 1992.29  Future
expansion aside, Euro Disneyland would boast twenty-nine attrac-
tions, six hotels, a 190,000 square foot entertainment center, a
campground, and a twenty-seven hole golf course surrounded by
one-family homes.30  Disney anticipated serving 15–17,000 meals
per hour, excluding snacks,31 in Disneyland Park’s32 combined sev-
enty restaurants, eateries, food carts, and cafeterias, and projected
receiving more than 11 million visitors in the first year.33  Disney’s
main goals were to control its financial exposure, as it did in Tokyo,
but also to obtain a substantial share of profits and management
control, which it failed to do in Japan.34  In what was regarded as a
mistake, given Tokyo Disney’s success, Disney relinquished owner-
ship of that Resort and licensed it to the Japanese in exchange for
royalties.35  Disney was determined not to miss a similarly profita-
ble opportunity in France by foregoing ownership, and so it
charged Joe Shapiro, Disney’s corporate counsel and lead negotia-
tor in Paris, with securing a deal that gave Disney both ownership
and control of EDL.  Shapiro negotiated simultaneously with more
than six French agencies.  He reported primarily to Wells, who
called at all hours of the day and night with new demands.36
Through Shapiro’s efforts, the parties agreed to Disney’s forming a
wholly owned French corporation, Euro Disney S.C.A. (“Euro
Disney”), that would own and operate EDL.  Thanks to a loophole
that allowed Disney to sell 51% of Euro Disney shares to the pub-
lic and still retain management control, as well as to receive royal-
ties from gross revenues, Disney overcame France’s legal
29 Euro Disneyland Financing Gains, N. Y. TIMES, July 8, 1988, at D12.
30 Joan Bakos, Allons Enfant au Euro Disneyland!, 90 RESTAURANT BUS. 96, 98 (1991).
31 Id. at 98.
32 Disneyland Park is one of two Parks at EDL, and is comparable to Magic Kingdom Park
(“Magic Kingdom”) at Walt Disney World Resort (“Walt Disney World”), Disney’s second Re-
sort, located in Lake Buena Vista, Florida.  See generally Disneyland Park, DISNEYLAND PARIS,
http://us.parks.disneylandparis.com/disneyland-park/index.xhtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).  See
generally also Magic Kingdom Park, WALT DISNEY WORLD, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/
destinations/magic-kingdom/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Magic Kingdom].  Disney-
land Park consists of five themed “Lands”: Main Street, USA, Frontierland, Fantasyland, Ad-
ventureland, and Discoveryland. See generally Disneyland Park: Lands, DISNEYLAND PARIS,
http://us.parks.disneylandparis.com/disneyland-park/lands/index.xhtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
33 Greenhouse, supra note 25, at C3.
34 EISNER, supra note 4, at 266.
35 See id. at 263.
36 See id. at 268. See also JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE GLOBAL NEGOTIATOR 86–87 (2003)
(having to negotiate simultaneously on home time and local time is one of the perils of interna-
tional deal-making).
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prohibition against foreign investors’ holding more than 49% inter-
ests in French companies.37
Just before the parties signed the contract, Prime Minister
Fabius and the Socialist party were voted out of office, and were
replaced by Jacques Chirac and the Conservatives.38  The new gov-
ernment was sympathetic to the Disney project (due partly to the
personal relationship Eisner cultivated with Chirac),39 but the
change in power meant that Disney had to start negotiating almost
from scratch.40  The final deal that Eisner and Chirac signed on
March 24, 1987 gave Disney 4,400 acres of Marne-la-Valle´e land at
a bargain price,41 a $700 million French government loan at below-
market interest rates, $400 million of financing of key infrastruc-
ture, France’s promise to construct a TGV stop at the Resort’s
front entrance and to expand the A-4 freeway, and other valuable
benefits.42  Disney would pay only 26% of the contract’s total
cost,43 and so could profit from EDL even if EDL lost money.44
Also important to the American company, France agreed to accept
Walt Disney’s claim of French ancestry.45  Eighty-five percent of
the French population supported the deal, despite the fact that
their taxes paid for much of it.46  And not surprisingly, Disney was
37 In 1988, French President Mitterrand declared an end to nationalizations; companies
could acquire up to 49% private capital.  Allowing privatization was intended to bring in billions
of francs, which were to be spent on public housing and repaying public debt. See COLIN
GORDON, THE BUSINESS CULTURE IN FRANCE 9 (1996).  Disney’s loophole was a law that al-
lowed majority shareholders to be overruled in certain circumstances of ownership.  Its effect
was providing Disney with 100% control of Euro Disney, despite its holding only a 49% interest.
See LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 30.
38 Paul Lewis, A French Disneyland Near Paris is Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1987, at
A16.
39 See EISNER, supra note 4, at 268.
40 Lewis, supra note 38, at A16.
41 Declaring the Disney development a “project of general interest,” the French government
exercised its eminent domain powers to freeze the land’s value at its agricultural price.  Babcock,
supra note 23, at 20 (internal quotation omitted).  The sale of productive farmland at below-
market prices triggered protests by French farmers, who were aware that property values sur-
rounding Disney sites had risen 20% in 25 years in California, 30% per year in Florida, and
faster in Tokyo than those of any other piece of Japanese land. Id.
42 See EISNER, supra note 4, at 265–266; LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 31–32.
43 Paul R. Michaud, Going Global: Wild Kingdom, 5 WORLD TRADE, no. 8, Oct. 1992 at *1.
44 See The Not-So-Magic Kingdom: Euro Disney, THE ECONOMIST (US), Sept. 26, 1992, at
87.
45 Roger Mills, James Dimech Debono & Victoria Dimech Debono, Euro Disney: A Mickey
Mouse Project?, 12 EUR. MGMT. J. 306, 307 (1994).
46 Id.  This figure was based on a poll conducted in 1987. Id.
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thrilled with the bargain, which one Disney official called “the deal
of the century.”47
Euro Disney’s very successful October 9, 1989 IPO was over-
subscribed at a high share price.  Like Tokyo Disney, Euro Disney-
land was expected to be an instant success.48  As Euro Disney
president Robert Fitzpatrick commented, “My biggest fear . . . is
that we will be too successful.”49  The financial community agreed:
Margo Vignola of Salomon Brothers opined, “I don’t think it can
miss. . . . They [Disney] are masters of marketing.  When the place
opens, it will be perfect.  And they know how to make people
smile—even the French.”50  Disney was entirely confident that it
had just negotiated its next great financial victory.
Despite this optimism, Euro Disney faced challenges that
likely would have crippled another company.  Protests over alleged
contractual irregularities by sixteen construction firms threatened
to block the grand opening.51  Disney negotiated around this
threat, but could not prevent the rail strike, bombing of a power
pylon, and damp, chilly weather that marred the Resort’s first day,
or stop the French farmers who blockaded the Resort’s entrance
with their tractors a few months later while protesting American
agricultural trade policies.52  The first summer, typically the peak
period for Disney visits, attracted a disappointing 30,000 tourists
per day, with particularly low numbers of French guests.53  The Re-
sort ran at a net Ffr339 million (approximately 51.7 million euro)
47 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1 (internal quotation omitted).
48 See Greenhouse, supra note 25, at C3.  This confidence was based partly on the fact that
Europeans accounted for over 2.7 million visits to Disney’s American Parks in 1990 and spent
$1.6 billion on Disney merchandise. Id.  Disney expected high attendance levels because the
Disney name and quality of experience would make the Resort a popular vacation destination,
because the Resort was easily accessible to more than 310 million people due to its central loca-
tion and proximity to airports, trains, and highways, and because Disney’s prices were compara-
ble to those of Paris’s major attractions with similar entertainment value.  Mills, Debono &
Debono, supra note 45, at 308.
49 Greenhouse, supra note 25, at C3.  In preparation for this possibility, Disney made plans
for emergency radio and subway announcements to warn people that Disneyland Park was full.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
50 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
51 Vicki Vaughan, Euro Disney Ironing Out Wrinkles: A French Labor Leader and 16 Con-
struction Companies Working on the Theme Park Blast the Company’s Way of Doing Business,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 9, 1992, at D1.
52 See Vicki Vaughan, Bonjour, Mickey Mouse—Euro Disney Opens, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Apr. 13, 1992, at A1; E. Tempest, Protestors Block Euro Disneyland France: Irked by U.S. Trade
Policies, Farmers use Tractors to Keep Cars and Buses out of the Park, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1992,
at 8. See also supra note 41 and infra note 88.
53 Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 308.
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operating loss after the first six months of operations.54  Euro Dis-
ney ran out of cash in 1993 and had to request emergency funds
from Disney.  Only a renegotiation of Euro Disney’s interest pay-
ments and fees in 199355 and a significant investment from Prince
Al-Waleed Bin Tahal, who offered to buy up to 24.5% of Euro
Disney, saved Euro Disney from a humiliating bankruptcy.56  Ironi-
cally, the Resort that was declared a success even before it was
built did not earn a net profit until 1995.57  Though Disney satisfied
all its interests in negotiating the EDL agreement, it overlooked
one crucial truth:  Even the best financial deal would fail if no one
came to the Resort.
III. THE ANALYSIS: WHY THE EMPIRE PROVED FALLIBLE
Disney’s opening and operating Euro Disneyland involved ne-
gotiations in three significant contexts: with the French government
to finance the Resort, with construction firms and intraorganiza-
tional employees to construct and operate the Resort, and with
tourists to sell the Resort and make it a success.  Part III analyzes
Disney’s achievements and errors in conducting the various negoti-
ations in light of negotiation theory regarding international deal-
making in general, and French-American negotiations in particu-
lar.58  It then addresses Disney’s attempt to “renegotiate” by cor-
recting its prior mistakes.  It becomes clear that throughout the
Euro Disneyland negotiations, Disney was guilty both of arrogance
and of poor prioritization: Assuming it could not fail, Disney fo-
cused on the money and lost sight of the people behind it.
54 Id. at 309.
55 See id. at 312.
56 See LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 140, 153.
57 The Kingdom Inside the Republic (New Management Strategy at Euro Disney), THE ECON-
OMIST (US), Apr. 13, 1996, at 66.
58 The negotiations in opening and operating EDL took place with construction firms, em-
ployees, and tourists from many countries other than France as well.  However, as France was
the host country and the majority of interactions were between French and Americans, this
Article focuses on negotiations between these two countries.  It should also be noted that refer-
ences to behaviors, traits, or attitudes “typical” to one culture are made with recognition that
such generalizations are inapplicable on the individual level. See, e.g., Kwok Leung, Rabi S.
Bhagat, Nancy R. Buchan, Miriam Erez & Cristina B. Gibson, Culture and International Busi-
ness: Recent Advances and Their Implications for Future Research, 36 J. INT’L. BUS. STUD. 357,
368–370 (Jul. 2005).  Characterizations of “French” and “American” negotiators are intended to
be read with that limitation in mind.
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A. Negotiations with the Government
Disney’s negotiation with the French government was argua-
bly its most successful one, insofar as the resulting deal met Dis-
ney’s interests.  Much of Disney’s success with the French
government is attributable to Disney’s understanding its negotia-
tion partner.  In business deals such as this one, the state’s main
goals are typically social or political, as Government officials have
strong interests in maintaining their power and are likely to focus
on short-term gains that will get them reelected.59  Thus, under-
standing the local government’s ideology, including its perception
of private investment, profit, and individual rights, is a crucial as-
pect of the negotiations for a company in Disney’s position.60  Dis-
ney had a strong sense of the French government’s interests in this
negotiation—Disney had watched the two governments fight over
the chance to host EDL, so its executives were well aware that the
French government primarily welcomed a Disney Resort as a solu-
tion to the unemployment problem and a boost to tourism, rather
than out of concern for Disney shareholders’ profits.61
Along with understanding governmental interests, interna-
tional dealmakers must also recognize the true role government
plays in the host country.62  Mayors of French communes are im-
portant officials with few checks on their power.63  Because it was
aware of the mayors’ power, Disney negotiated directly with the
national government to obtain state-controlled land, thereby
bypassing the local authorities and mitigating the risk of harass-
ment on the local level.64  Circumventing the municipal govern-
ment helped to assure Disney that a Marne Valley mayor would
not repudiate the negotiated deal if the terms later proved unfavor-
able to the French interests.65
59 BRETT, supra note 11, at 179.  In this case, French Socialists argued vehemently that
French money should be devoted to housing and immediate economic needs instead of to lend-
ing Disney 40% of the EDL project costs. Id. at 192.  Presumably, ten thousand new jobs and
billions of tourism revenue were enough incentive for French officials to proceed despite the
Socialist outcry.
60 Id. at 179.
61 To ensure these interests were met, the French insisted that Disney build a French tourism
office in Disneyland Park.  Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
62 See Christophe Dupont, International Business Negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIA-
TION: ANALYSIS, APPROACHES, ISSUES 375, 381–382 (Victor A Kremenyuk ed., 2002).
63 GORDON, supra note 37, at 162.
64 See infra text accompanying note 85.
65 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 179-180 (explaining that risk of repudiation by the gov-
ernment of burdensome contracts in the name of sovereignty and public welfare is one source of
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The process of negotiating with the various government agen-
cies was itself a vast undertaking.  Shapiro compared it to:
[C]oming to the United States and trying to make a deal with
the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Transportation; and it also
has to be approved by the House and the Senate.  Then you
have to make a deal with the governor of California, the county
of Los Angeles, the city of Los Angeles, the Burbank Redevel-
opment Agency, and you have to go to the Southern California
rapid transit people.66
Complex negotiations such as the EDL deal underscore the neces-
sity of studying the host government’s bureaucratic structure—
whether it makes or only implements policy decisions, how bureau-
crats get jobs, whether there is a climate of corruption, etc.67  Pre-
sumably aware of all of these challenges and issues, Disney
convinced France to name a full-time ministerial level official to
coordinate Euro Disney’s relations with the French government
and to avoid bureaucratic red tape.68  The use of such a mediator to
facilitate the business relationship between government and pri-
vate firm is recognized as a successful deal-making strategy,69 and
it served Disney well by streamlining the negotiation process.
Disney also wisely acknowledged the possibility that the EDL
deal could result in disputes with the French government.  Thus,
Shapiro was relentless in negotiating an arbitration provision that
would settle disputes at the International Chamber of Commerce,
rather than in French court.70  Agreement upon governing law is
essential in international negotiations; commercial arbitration pro-
visions provide the additional benefits of assuring neutrality, avoid-
ing costly litigation, and maintaining privacy.71  Disney’s insistence
upon arbitration was a prudent strategy to reduce its risk in dealing
with the French government.
instability inherent in international deal-making, as is the risk that the government may invoke
sovereign immunity).  In light of these possibilities, Disney’s precautions appear especially
prudent.
66 BRETT, supra note 11, at 191.
67 Id. at 192.
68 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.  The minister’s appointment was a product of negotiations
with Chirac. See infra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
69 SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 25.
70 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
71 SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 68.
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Disney also coped well with a risk present in all international
business deals: government regime change.72  Chirac’s assumption
of control over the French government two days before France
signed the contract with Disney could have toppled the deal, ex-
cept that Disney prepared   for the potential regime change in sev-
eral ways.  Negotiators met with Chirac as soon as it seemed that
Fabius would not remain in power, and secured Chirac’s promise
that if he were elected his government would continue working
with Disney.73  Chirac even agreed to reduce bureaucratic barriers
by appointing the aforementioned government minister.74  Dis-
ney’s circumvention of the potential problems caused by a govern-
ment regime change is largely attributable to the fact that the
American negotiators adopted the French norm of relationship
building in the pre-negotiation stage—France is considered a
highly affective,75 “high-context” culture,76 such that establishing a
personal relationship between the parties is a necessary precondi-
tion to substantive agreement.  Thus, Eisner’s personal relationship
with Chirac77 likely contributed a great deal to Chirac’s willingness
to work with Disney.
Though the final deal met Disney’s financial interests, negotia-
tions with the French government were hardly idyllic.  For instance,
the government demanded that Disney retitle Disneyland Park’s
attractions with French names.78  This demand was arguably attrib-
utable to an attempt by the government to preserve the integrity of
the French language, a mission that France conducts through its
French Academy, which endeavors to prevent French’s incorpora-
72 See id. at 179–180.
73 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 27.
74 Id.; see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
75 Jennifer M. George, Gareth R. Jones & Jorge A. Gonzalez, The Role of Affect in Cross-
Cultural Negotiations, 29 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 749, 757 (1998).  Members of  “highly affective”
cultures tend to display a great deal of emotional expression. Id.
76 BRETT, supra note 11, at 20.  “High-context” cultures typically prefer indirect, nuanced,
and inferential communications, and their negotiations depend upon close personal relationships
and well-developed communication networks. Id. at 20–21.  American culture is considered
“low-context,” meaning Americans prefer direct communication of explicit information. Id.  In
contrast with Disney’s conduct here, Americans tend to approach negotiation as a problem solv-
ing process and to emphasize results rather than relationships, and so they typically devote little
time to fostering interpersonal connections. See RAYMOND COHEN, NEGOTIATING ACROSS CUL-
TURES: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 36–37 (rev. ed.
1997).
77 See supra text accompanying note 39.
78 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
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tion of foreign words.79  Disney agreed to some name changes (for
example, renaming the Magic Kingdom’s Swiss Family Treehouse80
“La Cabane des Robinson”), but held firm on others (such as Main
Street, U.S.A. and Big Thunder Mountain Railroad81).82  This con-
flict demonstrates the hazard of ethnocentric thinking, which per-
vades international deal-making—negotiators tend to perceive
their own cultural group’s norms as superior, and as a result they
exert pressure on the other party to adopt their cultural protocols;
accordingly, the other side resists assimilation and insists on its own
cultural norms and values.83  The tension in the EDL negotiations
resulting from each culture’s insistence on its own choice of lan-
guage exemplifies the conflict created by ethnocentrism84 in inter-
national deals.
The language dispute with the national government is insignif-
icant compared to the cultural battles Disney waged with the local
municipality.  Disney’s decision to bypass the local governments
and negotiate directly with the state meant that the Marne-la-Val-
le´e officials were not called to the negotiating table at all, and were
completely excluded from the process.85  The national government
demanded the municipalities’ total and immediate cooperation to
accommodate Disney but made no attempt to consult local offi-
cials, and the communes in turn felt betrayed by the state.86  The
local governments decried the state’s seizure and sale of land as a
violation of the spirit of France’s expropriation law.87  They also
protested the state’s indifference to the inevitable environmental
harm the Resort’s construction would cause to the farming re-
79 See Janis Forman, Corporate Image and the Establishment of Euro Disney: Mickey Mouse
and the French Press, 7 TECHNICAL COMM. Q. 247, 255 (1998).
80 The Swiss Family Treehouse is a climbable tree house in the Magic Kingdom based on the
Disney film Swiss Family Robinson. See Attractions at Walt Disney World Resort, WALT DISNEY
WORLD, http://disneyworld.disney.go.com/attractions/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) [hereinafter
Attractions].
81 Main Street, U.S.A. is the main walkway, lined with shops and restaurants, in the Magic
Kingdom. See id.  Big Thunder Mountain Railroad is a roller coaster-type attraction designed as
a runaway mine train, located in the Magic Kingdom. See id.
82 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
83 BRETT, supra note 11, at 142.
84 Ethnocentrism refers to the “belief that your culture’s way of doing something is the best
way.” Id. at 235.
85 Forman, supra note 79, at 250.
86 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 24.
87 Id. at 25.  France’s expropriation law allowed seizure of land for a military base, railroad,
or nuclear power station.  Invoking it to accommodate EDL was, at best, a generous interpreta-
tion of the law, which some considered to be ironic in a country professing belief in “justice for
all.” See id.
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gion.88  Thus, Disney’s choice not to negotiate with the communal
governments laid the groundwork for hostile relationships between
Euro Disney and the domestic constituencies.
B. Negotiations with Outside Firms and
Intraorganizational Employees
Theoretically, one way for a foreign private firm to maintain
positive relations with the host country is to involve as many local
managers in the venture as possible.89  Disney worked toward this
end by collaborating with local businesses and by employing
French people at the Resort, but these efforts failed to achieve the
desired harmony.  Disney contracted with more than seven hun-
dred French and European construction firms to build EDL.90  The
American company assumed that the crisis-prone European con-
struction industry would welcome the new business, particularly
given Disney’s willingness to source almost all of the materials lo-
cally.91  In reality, construction in the Marne Valley was fraught
with discord.  A main source of tension was Disney’s insistence on
contracting to build EDL according to American construction stan-
dards.92  As one French construction official remarked, “It was
pure stupidity to work with Disney. . . . The way the contract was
drawn up, according to ‘American Standards,’ we were never in the
right. . . . So we gave up.  Signing with Disney was a big mistake.”93
Protesting against the American standards and threatening to
block EDL’s opening, sixteen European construction firms filed a
lawsuit against Euro Disney to collect on $170 million allegedly
inevitable cost overruns.94  This dispute reveals the added chal-
lenges posed by international contracting—no contract perfectly
captures the parties’ understanding in such a way as to prevent dis-
putes, and international contracts are particularly imperfect be-
cause of the parties’ difficulties in interpreting each other’s intent.95
Moreover, as illustrated by the fact that Disney had to pay the con-
88 See Forman, supra note 79, at 251.  One local farmer’s sign read: “Mickey, go home!  Look
at our fields and villages.  A monster is at the gates.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
89 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 163.
90 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
94 Id.  Euro Disney deemed this suit “[p]lain blackmail.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
95 SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 179–180.
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struction firms a settlement,96 enforcement mechanisms in interna-
tional deals tend to be less certain or more costly than in domestic
bargains.97  Rather than continue intercultural negotiations in the
construction process, Disney brought in American Imagineers98 to
take over the job.  Executive vice president of Imagineering
Mickey Steinberg explained the choice: “[O]ur own people are the
only ones who have the expertise we need to get this park built.”99
Thus, Disney chose to pursue its alternatives rather than to repair
the international negotiation’s broken relationships.
In addition to Euro Disney’s challenges with the local con-
struction firms, the company faced obstacles in the intercultural ne-
gotiations involved in training French employees (or as Disney
calls them, “Cast Members”100) and working with them at the Re-
sort.  Robert Fitzpatrick was officially president of Euro Disney,
but unofficially was a “goodwill ambassador” to the French Cast
Members.101  He held a doctorate in French literature and was
married to a French woman; he had also been acknowledged by the
press for his fluency in French.102  Disney’s choice of Francophile
Fitzpatrick for that position was an acknowledgment of the
French’s tendency to respond coolly to well-intentioned, but poorly
executed efforts to speak their language, and their preference that
foreigners not try at all.103  Disney strategically selected an Ameri-
can well-versed in French culture to lead the Euro Disney initiative
in hopes that he could bridge the Resort’s intraorganizational cul-
tural gaps.
In the twelve months prior to opening EDL, Euro Disney
hired, housed, and trained 12,000 Cast Members.104  Euro Disney
96 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.
97 Id.
98 Imagineers are employees of Disney’s Walt Disney Imagineering unit, which designs and
develops new Park concepts and attractions as well as Resorts. See Annual Report, supra note 2,
at 8.
99 EISNER, supra note 4, at 282 (internal quotation omitted).
100 See Diversity, DISNEYLAND PARIS, http://disneylandparis-casting.com/en/who-we-are/let-s-
talk-about-company/diversity (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).  As used herein, “Cast Members” re-
fers to all Park employees, from costumed characters to groundskeepers.
101 Forman, supra note 79, at 248.
102 Id.
103 CHARLES COGAN, FRENCH NEGOTIATING BEHAVIOR: DEALING WITH LA GRANDE NA-
TION 241 (2003).  This preference may not hold true in the extreme case, such as the one
presented by Jim Cora.  As Eisner described him, Cora was “blunt, no-nonsense, and so defi-
antly American that he refused to learn more than a few words of French during his seven years
in Paris.” EISNER, supra note 4, at 276.  Such ethnocentrism as Cora’s reinforces cultural differ-
ences. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
104 Bakos, supra note 30, at 102.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\15-1\CAC106.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-OCT-13 11:58
2013] MICKEY GOES TO FRANCE 207
paid 10% over the market average to attract high quality person-
nel.105  It hired only bilingual and trilingual employees, who all
were required to speak French and English, EDL’s two official lan-
guages.106  Many of them had never seen a Disney Park before, so
Euro Disney’s first challenge was to communicate Disney’s vision
to them.  Disney has a distinctive and well-established corporate
identity, which it perpetuates by training its employees rigorously
for Disney employment and by educating them about Disney cul-
ture.107  David Kanally, a Disney executive for twelve years and a
fluent French speaker, introduced the Cast Members to Disney’s
corporate philosophy by teaching them its history and its focus on
integrating hospitality and show business, as well as teamwork,
leadership, and various other job-specific topics.108
Disney’s approach in providing this training was theoretically
correct in some aspects.  International negotiation theory advises
beginning international negotiations by exchanging information
that helps the parties to understand each other’s culture.109  Argua-
bly, Disney attempted to develop a relationship with its French
Cast Members by educating them about the company, and by help-
ing them to understand their new business partner and what they
could expect from Disney employment.110  Moreover, Disney’s
standards created a common culture among the diverse staff, which
some organizational experts cite as a contributing factor to harmo-
nious relations within multinational organizations.111
105 Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.
106 Bakos, supra note 30, at 102.
107 See LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 95–97.  The Disney training program occurs at “Disney
University.” Id. at 95.  In their two-day training program entitled “Traditions,” new hires learn
Disney culture through films, worksheets, and team-building exercises.  All Cast Members re-
ceive reference guides. Id.  At France’s Disney University, “Le Guide du Cast Member” ex-
plained each Cast Member’s “role in the show,” “La Courtoisie Selon Disney” outlined
guidelines for verbal and nonverbal communication and guest service, and “The Euro Disney
Look” detailed Disney’s rules for Cast Member appearance. Id. at 96 (quotation marks omit-
ted).  These manuals instigated intra-organizational discord (see infra notes 112–127 and accom-
panying text), but Disney defended them as way of preserving the Park’s “carefully planned
setting and ambience of an on-stage area . . . with each cast member playing a supporting role.”
Id. at 97 (internal quotation omitted).
108 Bakos, supra note 30, at 102.
109 BRETT, supra note 11, at 144.
110 See Robert L. Kahn, Organizational Theory, in INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: ANALY-
SIS, APPROACHES, ISSUES 159, 187 (Victor A Kremenyuk ed., 2002).  Kahn refers to this as the
process of fostering “knowledge-based” trust—trust that is based on ability to understand the
other party’s interests and to predict his actions. See id.
111 See, e.g., BRETT, supra note 11, at 146.
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However, the recommended cultural introduction and the
communication of interests are intended to be bilateral.  Disney’s
unilateral cultural indoctrination better exemplifies the common
mistake of becoming ideologically positional,112 rather than engag-
ing in a mutually respectful process of exchange.  Disney did not
communicate with Cast Members in such a way that encouraged
Disney to adapt to the local environment.113  Instead, it imposed
the Disney culture on the French one, thereby assuming its way
was the “right” way, and the host culture’s customs were “wrong”
or “unacceptable.”114  Not surprisingly, the French were unrecep-
tive to this assertion.
Euro Disney’s problems magnified when it attempted to im-
plement Disney’s codes of conduct, which differed markedly from
French labor practices.  All French employment laws and regula-
tions are codified in the Code du travail.115  Each industry is gov-
erned by master collective agreements, which regulate working
hours, wages, and conditions.  Management is visibly hierarchical
and emphasizes individual self-reliance as opposed to integrative
teamwork and delegation,116 both of which Disney emphasizes.
Given the highly regulated nature of French labor and employ-
ment, Disney’s expectation that its American employment prac-
tices would translate into the French system was shortsighted, and
it resulted in a backlash.117  The Disney credo is “We work while
others have fun,”118 which for Disney particularly means the peak
tourist periods, including summers.  Requiring Cast Members to
work during the summer months contravened French employment
practices concerning employee holidays and overtime compensa-
tion.119  Moreover, French labor leaders referred to Disney’s ap-
pearance codes as “repressive.”120  Disney’s prohibitions against
112 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 119.
113 Dupont, supra note 62, at 121.
114 See BRETT, supra note 11, at 160.  This strategy is diametrically opposed to one that would
foster “identification-based trust”—trust that rests upon identification with the other party’s
desires, intentions, and values—which is an essential element in harmonious intra-organizational
relations. See Kahn, supra note 110, at 187.
115 GORDON, supra note 37, at 48.
116 See id. at 137.
117 See Forman, supra note 79, at 251.
118 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
119 Id.
120 Alan Riding, Only the French Elite Scorn Mickey’s Debut, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1992, at
A13.  The Disney codes mandate for women natural looking hair, only one ring per hand, mini-
mal makeup, earrings smaller than 2 cm in diameter, short nails, heels between 2-10 cm high,
skirts 8 cm above the knee, and “appropriate undergarments.”  Men are required to have well
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\15-1\CAC106.txt unknown Seq: 17 28-OCT-13 11:58
2013] MICKEY GOES TO FRANCE 209
Cast Members’ smoking, eating, or drinking publicly and against
arguing with guests or using foul language121 were similarly decried
by the press and French legal authorities.122  The media accused
Disney of trying to “rewrite the French employment code,” and the
French Ministry of Employment deemed Disney’s approach to reg-
ulating appearance and behavior “an awkward policy, directly
transposed from the United States, which is poorly integrated into
French culture.”123
Faced with this cultural gap in employment norms, the French
reacted in defense of their own culture,124 which manifested itself
in acts of rebellion.  The union struck, accusing the Euro Disney
police force of “spying” on Cast Members and of subjecting super-
visors to daily searches.125  One thousand Cast Members left EDL
in the first three months.126  Those who stayed failed to meet even
Disney’s lowest standards of guest relations policy—Cast Members
who were asked to take group photos purposefully cut guests’
heads from the pictures; ride attendants charged entrance fees for
attractions because guests did not know they were free; and, per-
haps most egregiously flouting Disney’s family focus, Cast Mem-
bers costumed as Disney characters stared down children and
refused to give them autographs.127
The difficulty integrating American business practices into
French employment was more fundamental than conflicting labor
codes—the two cultures approach guest relations differently.  In
France, unbridled enthusiasm is not a prominent—or desirable—
groomed hair above the collar and only one ring per hand, to be clean shaven, and to conceal
tattoos. Id. (quotation marks omitted); Forman, supra note 79, at 251–252; LAINSBURY, supra
note 14, at 96.
121 Forman, supra note 79, at 252.
122 See, e.g., id at 252–253.
123 Id. at 252 (internal quotation omitted).  Euro Disney’s vice president of personnel Thorolf
Degelmann explained the policies as intended to create a “conservative, professional look; we
want our employees to be warm, outgoing, and sincere.  We don’t want our guests to be dis-
tracted by oddities or mannerisms of the cast members.” LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 96 (inter-
nal quotation omitted).
124 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 114.
125 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1.  These searches were conducted because of widespread
theft by Cast Members.  As one EDL source put it, Cast Members were “taking home every-
thing imaginable,” including $170,000 from the Hotel New York. Id. (internal quotation omit-
ted).  The EDL police force was a source of conflict in itself, as French police contested Euro
Disney’s right to deny the French jurisdiction and to maintain its own private, plainclothes force.
Id.
126 Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.
127 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 107.
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feature of customer service.128  Accordingly, and perhaps predict-
ably, many of the French Cast Members refused to become “Dis-
neyfied,”129 and to follow Disney’s guest-relations protocols.
Unfortunately for Euro Disney, the guests were disappointed by
the Cast Members’ attitudes,130 which undermined the familiar im-
age of Disney that guests developed during past experiences at its
Parks.131  Such damage to its corporate image was precisely the
eventuality against which Disney had hoped to guard by training
Cast Members in Disney culture.
In Euro Disney’s defense, it was perhaps not wholly at fault in
attempting to employ its American parent company’s standards.  A
significant part of the package that the French government pur-
chased was the Disney image.  Disney purposefully provided the
same nature and quality of experience at each of its California,
Florida, and Tokyo Resorts, and to expect it to do otherwise be-
cause the French were unreceptive to the Disney model is perhaps
unfair.  Instead of criticizing Disney for adhering to its corporate
practices, which were by no means secret when negotiations with
France began, it might be more accurate to say that Disney should
have conducted sufficient research into French labor practices to
understand that its model would conflict with French norms.
Rather than select its locale based largely on the host government’s
financial offer, Disney perhaps should have selected the location
into which it would integrate most smoothly.
C. Negotiations with the Guests
Euro Disney’s difficulties with its French employees foreshad-
owed the cultural obstacles EDL faced in its initial interactions
with the French guests.  One EDL official summed up the situation
poignantly: “After our successful encounter with Japan’s highly
complex culture, we thought we’d be able to open a Disney Park in
128 Id. at 106.
129 Id. (quotation marks omitted).
130 See id.  A British journalist remarked that the Cast Members were “mostly, nice
enough. . . . ‘Mostly,’ because even on opening weekend some clearly couldn’t care less. . . . My
overwhelming impression of the employees was that they were out of their depth.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted).
131 One American tourist lamented the shattered illusion: “Most of the workers are simply
not aiming to please. . . . They are playing a different game than their American counterparts.
They are acting like real people instead of ‘Disney’ people.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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any part of the world—that is, until we arrived in France.”132  It is
essential to international ventures’ success that the visiting firm
foster a positive local identity and public image.133  Euro Disney’s
near bankruptcy is arguably attributable to Disney’s failure from
the outset of EDL’s construction to win popular favor in France.
Disney began the construction process without empathizing
with, or even fully understanding, the importance the Marne Valley
populace placed on agricultural traditions.134  Disney assumed the
French, who suffered from widespread unemployment, would
gladly accept Disney jobs, even though the employment markedly
differed from the area’s traditional industries.135  In this way, Dis-
ney erred by engaging in ethnocentric thinking: It considered the
local populace’s preference for agricultural tradition over industrial
development to be irrational because the community needed work,
and it assumed its assessment of the region’s best interests was su-
perior to that of the local citizens.136  Opting to try to persuade the
locals to give up their lifestyle, Disney determined the balance of
values favored the American pro-development position, and made
no attempt to win community support by preserving the region’s
agricultural traditions.137  Because it discounted the French peo-
ple’s preferences as irrational, Disney displayed a lack of respect
for the French culture.138
In reaction to Disney’s ethnocentrism, the French quickly re-
jected Disney.  French intellectuals lambasted Euro Disneyland.
Writer Jean Cau called EDL “a horror made of cardboard, plastic
and appalling colors, a construction of hardened chewing gum and
idiotic folklore taken straight out of comic books written for obese
132 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1 (internal quotation omitted).
133 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 163.
134 See Dupont, supra note 62, at 381–382 (noting that lacking empathy and sufficient knowl-
edge of the host country is one of the most common errors international negotiators make).
135 See BRETT, supra note 11, at 8.
136 See id. at 8, 160.  Treating the other countrymen as second-class citizens by rejecting their
ideas reinforces cultural differences. See id. at 160.
137 See id. at 9.
138 French Ambassador Ge´rard Errera considers a show of respect to be the key to negotiat-
ing with the French. See COGAN, supra note 103, at 125.  The French culture has been character-
ized as demonstrating simultaneous superiority (“la Grand Nation”) and inferiority (“culture of
the underdog”) complexes, which makes the French particularly sensitive to perceived disre-
spect. See id. at 13–14 (quotation marks omitted). These competing influences predispose the
French to be wary of giving in easily to foreigners, and reinforce their desire to be treated as a
stronger negotiating partner’s equal. Id. at 14.  Thus, Disney’s failure to show respect for the
French cultural traditions exemplifies the type of interaction with Americans that “only confirms
for the French that Americans are ignorant of the central role France has played” in interna-
tional affairs. Id. at 15 (internal quotation omitted).
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Americans.”139  Others echoed Cau’s sentiments, referring to EDL
as “a terrifying giant’s step toward world homogenization,” and ex-
pressing hope for “a May 1992 that will set fire to Euro Disney-
land.”140  To an extent, the intellectuals’ comments simply reflect a
degree of anti-Americanism in French society.141  More subtly, they
reveal the fear that American (and Disney) cultural imperialism
would succeed in altering French society because the French citi-
zens would actively embrace American norms.142  In response, the
intellectuals espoused French nationalist ideology as a defensive
posture, and rejected Disney as a threat to their perceived national
interests.143
Despite French critics’ excoriations, Disney made some good-
faith efforts to earn acceptance in Europe.  Eisner spent part of the
summer of 1988 in France meeting with European managers and
developing relationships with them, seeking to understand French
people’s everyday interests and patterns.144  Disney also carefully
contemplated the best approach to take in packaging EDL for the
French people.  Disney did not simply import its American Resorts
into France, as it had in Tokyo.  Imagineering executive Tony Bax-
ter, who designed Disneyland Park, explained, “We’re building a
resort next to one of the most sophisticated, cultured cities in the
world, and we’re going to be competing with the great art and ar-
chitecture of Europe.  We have to do something unique.”145  Dis-
ney executives agreed that the French Resort would require more
sophistication and attention to artistic detail than was present even
in Disney’s other meticulously designed Resorts.146  But rather
than “take Mickey Mouse and try to do surgery to create a trans-
mogrified hybrid, half French and half American,”147  Disney in-
stead aspired to build its Disneyland Park in a way that paid tribute
to the local influences but remained thoroughly American.
Achieving this goal meant emphasizing throughout Disney-
land Park the fact that many Disney characters, including Cinder-
ella and Peter Pan, originated in European fables.  These
139 Riding, supra note 120, at A1 (internal quotation omitted).
140 Id. at A13 (quoting writers Jacques Julliard and Alain Finkelkraut) (internal quotation
omitted).
141 See COGAN, supra note 103, at 42.
142 See Forman, supra note 79, at 249. See also Riding, supra note 120, at A13.
143 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 119–120.
144 EISNER, supra note 4, at 273, 275.
145 Id. at 270 (quotation marks omitted).
146 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 54.
147 Greenhouse, supra note 25, at C3 (internal quotation omitted).
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characters received more prominence in EDL than in the domestic
Parks, and where possible, Disney called them by their French
names (e.g., Sleeping Beauty was “La belle au bois dormant”).148
Similarly, Disney adapted the domestic Parks’ Tomorrowland149 to
become EDL’s Discoveryland, in which the American company
celebrated famous Europeans from history, such as Jules Verne,
Leonardo da Vinci, and H.G. Wells.150  Further, employing a recog-
nized relationship building technique,151 Disney continually em-
phasized Walt Disney’s ancestral French roots and time served in
France as a World War I ambulance driver.152  Moreover, Disney
tried to adapt the Resort’s menus to the European palate by invit-
ing six hundred restaurants to submit ideas and recipes—based on
these suggestions, it made changes such as refining its Tex-Mex rec-
ipes to be less spicy, and developing a new coffee blend that would
appeal more to Europeans.153  Further, when market research re-
vealed Europeans’ strong association of the United States with the
Wild West, and in light of the French’s love of cowboys from fron-
tier dramas, Disney responded by importing Frontierland154 from
the domestic Parks to France.155
Notwithstanding these attempts to adapt to its new locale, Dis-
ney largely failed to penetrate the French market.  To succeed in
business in France, a company must fully understand French taste
and the market’s regional nature—individual pockets of popula-
tion demand individual agents and attention.156  Disney erred be-
cause it treated Europe as a homogenous market;157 it did not
recognize that European tourists’ habits vary greatly by country.158
It also made the mistake of advertising EDL in Europe using meth-
ods developed in the United States.  The original ad campaigns
targeted children and featured Mickey or Pluto introducing the
148 Forman, supra note 79, at 250.
149 Tomorrowland is a section of the Magic Kingdom with future and space-themed rides and
attractions. See generally Magic Kingdom, supra note 32.
150 Riding, supra note 120, at A13.  The technique of paying special tribute to France’s histori-
cal achievements is one that Cogan recommends to American negotiators as a way of according
France respect. See COGAN, supra note 103, at 239–241.
151 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 48.
152 Riding, supra note 120, at A13.
153 Bakos, supra note 30, at 98.
154 Frontierland is a section of the Magic Kingdom with American West-themed rides and
attractions. See generally Magic Kingdom, supra note 32.
155 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 57.
156 GORDON, supra note 37, at 158.
157 See Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.
158 The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.
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rides and parades available inside the Park.159  This technique
worked in the U.S. because adults there had visited Disney Resorts
as children, but European adults associated Disney with
magazines, films, and toys, not with a vacation trip; consequently,
Europeans thought the advertised “theme park” was just an over-
priced fair.160  Thus, Disney’s negotiation mistake was cultural ster-
eotyping, insofar as it treated all Europe as a whole rather than as
individual regions with varying interests.161
Moreover, Disney vastly overestimated the relative value
Europeans would place on EDL admission, food, and lodging.  The
admission charge in 1991 dollars was $40 for adults and $27 for
children under 11.162  After the September 1992 collapse of the Ex-
change Rate Mechanism, it became 10-20% more expensive for
some European tourists to visit, and attendance declined by as
much as 50% in the affected countries.163  Currency fluctuations
are a risk inherent in every international deal.164  But rather than
adapt to the currency devaluation by lowering prices, Euro Disney
maintained the current levels.  Prices were so high in the Resort
that guests began smuggling in their own food and drink to com-
pensate for the admission charges.165  Euro Disney did not even
decrease the hotel room prices, notwithstanding the fact that from
the outset it was charging more than market research suggested
was appropriate.166  Accordingly, guests opted to stay in Paris and
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 111.
162 Riding, supra note 120, at A13.
163 Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.
164 SALACUSE, supra note 36, at 179–180.
165 Peter Curwen, Euro Disney: The Mouse That Roared (not!), 95 EUR. BUS. REV. 15, 17
(1995).  Guests may not bring outside food and beverages into the Parks at EDL. See FAQ,
DISNEYLAND PARIS, http://us.disneylandparis.com/faq/index.xhtml?# (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
Disney permits guests to bring outside food and beverages into the Parks at Walt Disney World,
but not at Disneyland. See Disney Theme Parks & Water Parks—Frequently Asked Questions,
WALT DISNEY WORLD, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/faq/parks/outside-food-and-drink/
(last visited Mar. 2, 2013); see also FAQ: Dining, DISNEYLAND RESORT, http://disneyland.disney.
go.com/faq/dining/#dining-q5 (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
166 See EISNER, supra note 4, at 280.  Disney executives increased hotel prices in 1989 above
the initial plan because they determined the rooms’ quality and amenities made it reasonable to
charge an extra $20-30/night.  Eisner refers to the added construction costs from additional
amenities and the resulting rental price increases as a “self-perpetuating cycle of enthusiasm and
optimism.” Id.
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commute to the Resort, rather than pay EDL’s inflated hotel
rates.167
Its initial efforts to please the French palate aside, perhaps the
clearest example of Disney’s misunderstanding French culture is
the way it approached food and beverage throughout EDL.  Dis-
ney incorrectly assumed that the French would want only croissants
and coffee for breakfast in the hotels, and was wholly unprepared
when it turned out they wanted full, seated breakfasts.168  And
while the food was supposedly better in EDL than at Disney’s
other Resorts,169 the menus were too complicated and pricey for
guests who wanted quick service meals in lieu of France’s tradi-
tional, sit-down repasts.170  But Euro Disney’s greatest offense was
its decision to uphold Disney’s then-longstanding policy of prohib-
iting alcohol in the Magic Kingdom.171  For the French, who view
wine as an important part of everyday life, the alcohol ban exem-
plified the American company’s incompatibility with—and insensi-
tivity to— French culture.172  These instances demonstrate Disney’s
failure to ascertain the true interests of its negotiating partners, the
French guests.  Disney made assumptions where it should have
asked questions, with the result that the French did not welcome
the Resort’s construction from the outset, and were not won over
during the initial operating period.
Arguably, the most significant factor in Disney’s failure to find
favor with the French people was its arrogance.  The interviews in
Le Figaro Economique quoted Euro Disney executives making
such comments as “There is a world of difference between Disney
and others. . . . There is Disney, Disney, Disney, Disney and the
others.  We are already the best.”173  In a country filled with beauti-
ful, historic castles, the Americans were claiming, “We’re building
something immortal, like the pharaohs built the pyramids.”174  Dis-
167 Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.  As a result, EDL’s initial hotel occu-
pancy averaged only 55%. Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 EISNER, supra note 4, at 283.
171 Id.  In this instance, “Magic Kingdom” refers generally to the Magic Kingdom at Walt
Disney World, Disneyland Park at Disneyland, and Tokyo Disneyland at Tokyo Disney.  Disney
has now broken from that policy at Be Our Guest Restaurant, located in the Magic Kingdom at
Walt Disney World, which serves wine and beer. See Be Our Guest Restaurant: Menu, WALT
DISNEY WORLD, https://disneyworld.disney.go.com/dining/magic-kingdom/be-our-guest-restau
rant/menus/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2013).
172 See Riding, supra note 120, at A13.
173 EISNER, supra note 4, at 281 (internal quotation omitted).
174 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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ney came to France convinced its success was assured.  Perceiving
itself as the stronger negotiator, it failed to reach out to the party
across the table.  And for a culture that yearns for recognition of its
international importance,175 such arrogance as Disney displayed
could only lead to one conclusion: The French guests ended negoti-
ations, and Euro Disney nearly went bankrupt.176
D. Renegotiation: Mickey Takes French Lessons
After a year of troubled interactions with the French people,
Disney then “reopened” negotiations by endeavoring to correct its
mistakes.  First, Disney learned that an American fluent in French
is still an American.  Despite his connections with the French cul-
ture, Fitzpatrick failed to bridge the cultural gap as Euro Disney
president and (later) chairman,177 arguably because the French can
“never really be comfortable with foreigners who are not fully as-
similated.”178  So, in 1993, Euro Disney appointed Philippe
Bourguignon, a Frenchman, to succeed Fitzpatrick as the new
chairman and charged him with overcoming the cultural discon-
nect.179  Bourguignon responded to his task by fostering dialogue
with the Cast Members.  Between 1994 and 1996 he had breakfast
with the staff twice a week to learn from them how he could im-
prove the Resort.180  Under Bourguignon, Euro Disney also
adapted its work practices to become more French—it recognized
standard French employee classifications, set a maximum work
week, and annualized hourly work schedules.181  The combination
of soliciting the Cast Members’ opinions and creating a more tradi-
tionally French workplace greatly improved intraorganizational
relations.
Having negotiated successfully with the Cast Members,
Bourguignon next sought to win the French guests’ favor by dem-
175 See supra note 138.
176 See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
177 Fitzpatrick was named Euro Disney’s chairman in 1992 when Philippe Bourguignon was
appointed as its president.  E. Tempest, French Dip: With Attendance Lagging, Euro Disney will
Step up Marketing in France, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1992, at 2.
178 COGAN, supra note 103, at 126 (internal quotation omitted).
179 Bourguignon succeeded Fitzpatrick as chairman effective April 12, 1993.  James Bates,
When in France, Do as the French: Euro Disney: Theme Park Operator, in Apparent Response to
Soft Attendance, Elevates a Native Son to Chairman, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1993, at 1.
180 The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.
181 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 136.
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onstrating awareness of their interests and priorities.  This meant
cutting prices: He slashed Park admission for adults in the high sea-
son by 20%, offered numerous special promotions in the winter
months, and reduced the cost of the least expensive hotel rooms by
a third.182  Moreover, Bourguignon gave Paris-area residents a spe-
cial 30% admission discount.183  Under the Frenchman’s command,
advertising for EDL changed its focus to target adults—new ads
depicted parents’ responses to seeing their children’s happiness
and groups of adults sitting tensely before riding Space Mountain:
Mission 2.184  Euro Disney also began tailoring its promotions to
individual national markets.  Between 1994 and 1996 it opened of-
fices in London, Frankfurt, Milan, Brussels, Amsterdam, and Ma-
drid, each of which customized vacation packages for the regional
audience.185
Further, Bourguignon strove to correct the American com-
pany’s misperceptions of French consumption habits.  Rather than
the “tastefully embroidered” merchandise that Euro Disney had
been selling (assuming European guests would prefer apparel more
like the designer goods they typically purchased), Euro Disney
started vending the same unapologetically cartoonish shirts, hats,
and backpacks that Disney sells in America.186  Bourguignon also
encouraged Euro Disney to revamp EDL’s well-intentioned, but
inappropriate menus, declaring, “people do not come to the park
for a gastronomic experience.”187  Euro Disney executives eventu-
ally realized that trying to recreate Europe’s epicurean culture at
the Resort was a mistake: “We know that Americans don’t want us
to open a French restaurant in New York or Los Angeles that
serves a double patty cheeseburger . . . and that the French don’t
want us to come over there and do crepes. . . . They want us to do
what we do.”188  Even so, Euro Disney also demonstrated a willing-
ness to accommodate its new locale by departing from its normal
182 The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.
183 Mills, Debono & Debono, supra note 45, at 309.
184 The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.  Space Mountain: Mission 2 is
an attraction in Disneyland Park that features a “supercharged canon” [sic] that takes guests on
a “warp-speed ride into the unknown.” Discoveryland: Attractions: Space Mountain: Mission 2,
DISNEYLAND PARIS, http://us.parks.disneylandparis.com/disneyland-park/lands/discoveryland/at
tractions/space-mountain-mission2.xhtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).  Space Mountain: Mission 2
is similar to Space Mountain at Walt Disney World. See Attractions, supra note 80.
185 The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.
186 Id.
187 Id. (internal quotation omitted).
188 LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 134 (quoting Michael Eisner) (internal quotation omitted).
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practices—it broke from Disney’s longstanding policy and allowed
alcohol into Disneyland Park.189
Euro Disney began to understand that the European guests
came to EDL to experience Disney, not Disney’s version of Eu-
rope.  And EDL began to win the guests’ favor because it started
responding to the desires they expressed, rather than forcing upon
them what it assumed they wanted.  Some of these changes seem
comparatively small, such as an increase in morning room service
to compensate for the shortage of available breakfast seating.190
Others reveal a greater level of empathy, such as the Resort’s
newly created festivities for European holidays like Bastille Day
and Oktoberfest.191  But perhaps the most telling of Euro Disney’s
active attempts to improve intercultural relations was Euro Dis-
neyland’s October 1, 1994 official renaming to “Disneyland
Paris.”192  Eisner offered this insight into the decision to rename
EDL: “As Americans, we had believed that the word ‘Euro’ in
front of Disney was glamorous and exciting.  For Europeans, it
turned out to be a term they associated with business, currency,
and commerce.  Renaming the park ‘Disneyland Paris’ was a way
of identifying it not just with Walt’s original creation but with one
of the most romantic and exciting cities in the world.”193  With this
decision, Disney finally did what an international negotiator should
do: It cast off its stereotypes and assumptions, investigated and em-
pathized with its counterparty’s interests, and reached a mutually
acceptable, culturally integrative solution.
IV. CONCLUSION: ADVICE ON EXPANDING THE EMPIRE
Looking back on the EDL venture, one wizened Euro Disney
official commented, “If we had to do it over again . . . we’d proba-
bly think twice—not only about setting up shop in France, but
about our approach to exporting Disney abroad altogether.”194
Contrasted with the widespread optimism expressed prior to the
Resort’s opening,195 this remark raises the question whether the
Disney model can—and should—be integrated into cultures vastly
189 The Kingdom Inside the Republic, supra note 57, at 66–67.
190 See LAINSBURY, supra note 14, at 134.
191 Id. at 132.
192 See supra note 6.
193 EISNER, supra note 4, at 292.
194 Michaud, supra note 43, at *1 (internal quotation omitted).
195 See supra notes 48–50 and accompanying text.
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different from the American one in which it was developed.  Dis-
ney’s experiences prior to EDL argue that Disney has truly univer-
sal appeal.  Disneyland and Walt Disney World both attract visitors
from across the globe, and Tokyo Disney is an undisputed suc-
cess.196  But with Disney’s Parisian experience to demonstrate its
fallibility, and in light of its recently-opened Resort in Hong Kong
and soon-to-open Resort in Shanghai,197 it is appropriate to query
whether the Disney image really is a global commodity.  The an-
swer to this question could be “yes” if Disney hones its intercul-
tural negotiation techniques.  Though directed particularly at
Disney, the following advice is relevant for any multinational firm.
For Disney to succeed in global operations, it must avoid cul-
tural stereotypes.  It must base decisions on what it learns about
other cultures, not what it assumes about them.  As the successful
appointment of Philippe Bourguignon as head of Euro Disney
demonstrates, Disney should rely upon cultural natives to educate
it about what will succeed in the host culture.  The implications of
this statement extend beyond mere market research—bestowing
real decision-making power on members of the local culture will
enable Disney to make the most culturally-appropriate decisions.
Disney must also strike a balance between adapting to the
host environment and sacrificing its corporate identity.  While the
alcohol ban, for example, was a longstanding Disney policy,198 it
was also an ethnocentric one: Deeming alcoholic beverages to be
not “family-friendly” is arguably inappropriate in a society that
seamlessly integrates alcohol into family life.  When faced with
such cultural gaps, Disney should reevaluate its policies and deter-
mine whether they are actually fundamental to its corporate image,
or merely fundamental to its corporate image in the United States,
based on what the American culture deems appropriate.  Those ad-
aptations that do not undermine what is essentially “Disney”
should be made in the name of cultural integration.  Making con-
cessions that are not truly adverse to Disney’s interests helps to
bridge the cultural gap, and allows Disney to stand firm in negoti-
ating those issues that really do implicate its values.
Finally, Disney should negotiate with awareness that even it, a
veritable empire, is fallible.  A modicum of humility will serve Dis-
ney better than the abundance of bravado that Disney executives
196 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
197 Hong Kong Disneyland opened on September 12, 2005. Annual Report, supra note 2 at
11.  Shanghai Disney Resort is currently targeted to open during the calendar year 2015. Id.
198 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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exhibited in the EDL negotiations.  Disney should focus on offer-
ing the high quality products and experiences the world has come
to love, but should also recognize that such love—and the profits
that accompany it—must be earned and deserved.  Michael Eisner
urged Disney officials to adopt the attitude of “[w]e will try hard
and we hope you will like us.”199  Though Disney has rejected Eis-
ner’s leadership,200 to succeed in its international negotiations, Dis-
ney should embrace his refrain.
199 EISNER, supra note 4, at 281 (quotation marks omitted).
200 See Laura M. Holson, A Quiet Departure for Eisner at Disney, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2005,
at C6 (noting Eisner was “stripped of his chairman’s title” in 2004 after a “shareholder revolt”
and ultimately left Disney in 2005).
